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BY FREYA KRISTJANSON 
Cet article examine ['e'volution 
historique des concepts du droit civil 
qui tendent h utiliser la substitution 
dans les cas d'inconduite sexuelle des 
employks, et  aborde les dbveloppements 
rkcents de la loi canadienne. 
There has always been a high inci- 
dence of sexual assault and abuse in 
Canadian society. However, for the 
first time, and in significant num- 
bers, individuals and groups are seek- 
ing legal redress-civil, criminal, and 
administrative-against both perpe- 
trators and others, such as employ- 
. . 
ers, who may be held responsible. 
The rise in sexual assault litigation 
in the last decade has spurred tre- 
mendous developments in legal doc- 
trine, in areas such as limitation pe- 
riods and fiduciary duty (see M. (K) 
v. M. (H.); Norberg v. Wynrib). The 
next frontier for radical legal devel- 
opments will be the area ofvicarious 
liability for sexual assault. Trial and 
appellate courts across the country 
are developing new-often contra- 
dictory--tests for determining when 
a person or institution will be vicari- 
ously liable for the tortious sexual 
misconduct of someone else. This 
article will provide an overview of 
legal issues relating to vicarious li- 
ability for vicarious assault-the 
"who, what, where, when, andwhy." 
The focus of this paper will be on 
institutionalvicarious liabilityfor the 
sexual misconduct of employees and 
agents. Whether it is religious or- 
ganizations, sports teams, daycare 
centres, child protection agencies, 
private employers, residential hcili- 
ties for the disabled, hospitals, or 
schools, there is the potential for the 
sexual exploitation of children and 
vulnerable adults. 
Courts across the 
country are 
developing 
new tests for 
determining when 
a person or 
institution will be 
vicariously liable for 
the tortious sexual 
misconduct of 
someone else. 
This article will also examine the 
historical evolution of the common 
law concept ofvicarious liability; the 
policy justifications which operate 
both in favour of and against extend- 
ing such liability; and examines de- 
velopments in Canadian law. The 
Supreme Court of Canada will 
shortly be examining these issues: 
now is the time for those concerned 
with the development of the law to 
focus their attention on this impor- 
tant question. 
What is vicarious liability? 
Vicarious liability means that the 
law holds an individuallentity liable 
for the misconduct of another, even 
though that individual or entity is 
free from personal blameworthiness 
or fault and is, in that sense, "inno- 
cent" ofany wrong-doing. The theo- 
retical basis for vicarious liability has 
been historically located in two com- 
peting maxims. The first maxim, qur 
far i t  per  allium far i tper  se ("whoever 
acts through another, acts through 
himself'), is based on the enterprise 
theory ofliability-where the acts of 
the tortfeasor are sufficiently con- 
nected with the enterprise, they are 
construed as the acts of the enter- 
 rise. The second maxim, respondeat 
superior ("the superior must answer"), 
identifies a liability principle on the 
basis of control. 
The key, however, is that an indi- 
vidual or entity may be held liable in 
. . 
the absence of any evidence of fault, 
knowledge, carelessness, recklessness, 
wilful blindness, negligence, or any 
of the traditionally accepted bases of 
legal liability. The law requires us to 
presume that the employer in these 
cases is morally blameworthy; where 
there is fault, the institution will be 
held liable for that fault under the 
appropriate legal doctrines. 
Distinguishing direct and 
vicarious liability 
Institutions may be directly liable 
where their own negligence created 
the conditions for the misconduct 
and damage to occur. Examples of 
claims advanced against institutions 
for negligence generally include: hir- 
ing (failure to properly screen candi- 
dates; failure to contact references; 
failure to test employee propensi- 
ties); supervision and training (fail- 
ure to adequately supervise; failure 
to train employees relating to sexual 
conduct, detection, reporting); per- 
formance review (failure to monitor; 
failure to record issues as they arise; 
lack of regular feedback, failure to 
address suspicions); security (failure 
to ensure that the premises are prop- 
erly secured to prevent the occur- 
rence of sexual misconduct); appro- 
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priate response (failure to respond 
immediately or appropriately to 
awarenessofsexual misconduct); and, 
failure to warn (failure to warn indi- 
viduals of the risk of sexual miscon- 
duct, including failure to warn sub- 
sequent employers). 
In each ofthese instances, the alle- 
gation is that the institution should 
have, or could have done something 
to reduce a foreseeable risk. These 
factors are irrelevant to the analysis 
of vicarious liability, where the issue 
is not-could or should the institu- 
tion have done something? Did the 
institution fail its duty?-but rather, 
a strict liability imposed solely be- 
cause of the juridical relationship 
with the wrongdoer. 
Who is vicariously liable? 
A person or entity may be held 
vicariously liable for a tort commit- 
ted by someone else, as long as that 
person and the tortfeasor are con- 
nected by a relevant juridical rela- 
tionship. Traditional common law 
holds that vicarious liability may at- 
tach to aperson in an employment or 
agency relationship with the tort- 
feasor; vicarious liability will not at- 
tach if the tortfeasor is an independ- 
ent contractor. The classic test used 
by the courts in determining either 
employment or agency is a four-fold 
test involving: (1) control; (2) own- 
ership of tools; (3) chance of profit; 
and (4) who bears the risk of loss. 
More recently, courts are supple- 
menting this analysis with reference 
to the organizational test in order to 
determine whether the tortfeasor is 
an integral part of the organization, 
on the theory that the organization is 
responsible for what is done by those 
who act on its behalf. The emphasis 
is on whether the alleged servant or 
agent is part of his or her employer's 
organization, and whether his or her 
work is subject to "coordination or 
control as to 'where' and 'when' rather 
than 'how"' (see Mayer v. J. Conrad 
LavigneLtd.). The organizational test 
distinguishes between an employee, 
who forms an integral part of the 
business, and an independent con- 
tractor, whose services are accessory 
to the normal business activities. 
Religious institutions have tried 
to defend against vicarious liability 
claims on the grounds that priests, 
for example, are not "employees or 
agents" of the Catholic church; the 
relationship is a voluntary one, or an 
This is the key 
issue: when will 






within the course 
of employment? 
ecclesiastical one governed solely by 
canon law to the exclusion ofsecular 
employment law principles (see WK. 
v. Pornbacher; M .  (F. W.) v. 
Mombourquette). The courts, how- 
ever, have held that whatever the 
ecclesiastical relationship, the indi- 
cia ofcontrol indicate that a relation- 
ship between a priest and his Diocese 
is akin to an employment relation- 
ship, and thus vicarious liability may 
be imposed upon the Church. 
It appears that Canadian courts 
are reluctant to allow those ultimately 
responsible to hide behind the veil of 
the "independent contractor" dis- 
tinction. A good example is the Brit- 
ish Columbia Court ofAppeal deci- 
sion in C.A. v. Critchley. The indi- 
vidual plaintiffs were wards of the 
Superintendent of Child Welfare 
placed at Arden Park Youth Ranch, 
a residential facility, where they were 
physically and sexually abused by its 
proprietor, John Critchley. Crirchley 
died in jail, and the action proceeded 
against the Crown. The Crown ar- 
gued that Critchley was an inde- 
pendent contractor, an "ownerlop- 
erator," and his contract specified 
that he was not a government em- 
- 
ployee. The evidence, however, dem- 
onstrated the degree of control 
through both government funding, 
direct involvement in the operations 
of Arden Park, and the conferral of 
"virtual 24-hour-a-day parental au- 
thority" and the Court concluded 
that "all of the indicia of a relation- 
ship which would attract vicarious 
liability are present." 
When will vicarious liability be 
imposed? 
Once it has been established that 
an employment or agency relation- 
ship exists between the employer1 
principal and the tortfeasor, tradi- 
tional legal analysis requires that the 
wrongful act must fall within the 
scope or course ofemployment. This 
is the key issue: when will the courts 
find tha; wilful misconduct amount- 
ing to criminal activity, specifically 
sexual misconduct, falls within the 
course of employment? 
The traditional test (often referred 
to as the Salmond test) was set out by 
Salmond and Heuston in The Law of 
Torts: 
A master is not responsible for a 
wrongful act done by his serv- 
ant unless it is done in the course 
of employment. It is deemed to 
be so done if it is either (1) a 
wrongful act authorised by the 
master, or (2) a wrongful and 
unauthorised mode of doing 
some act authorised by the mas- 
ter.. . . But a master, as opposed 
to the employer ofan independ- 
ent contractor, is liable even for 
acts which he has not author- 
ised, provided they are so con- 
nected with acts which he has 
authorised that they may be re- 
garded as modes-although 
improper modes-of doing 
them.. . . If a servant does negli- 
gently that which he was au- 
thorised to do carefully, or ifhe 
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does fraudulently that which he 
was authorised to do honestly, 
or if he does mistakenly that 
which he was authorised to do 
correctly, his masterwill answer 
for that negligence, fraud or 
mistake. O n  the other hand, if 
the unauthorised and wrongful 
act of the servant is not so con- 
nected with the authorised act 
as to be a mode of doing it, but 
is an independent act, the mas- 
ter is not responsible: for in such 
a case the servant is not acting in 
the course of his employment, 
but  has gone outside it.  
(Heuston and Buckley 456-57) 
This test has resulted in confusion 
in the jurisprudence, as courts have 
strained to distinguish between an 
unauthorized, wrongful act of the 
servant which is a mode of doing the 
authorized act, as opposed to a com- 
pletely independent act. Of  note, 
however, is that the courts have had 
little difficulty in accepting that cer- 
tain traditional intentional torts (theft 
by fund managers, fraud by law 
clerks) fit within the Salmond test, 
notwithstanding that they are anti- 
social, criminal acts that no employer 
- .  
would authorize. They are "wrong- 
ful" modes of doing an authorized 
act. Yet when faced with sexual as- 
sault (another intentional, anti-so- 
cial, unauthorized, and criminal act), 
there has been great reluctance to 
impose vicarious liability. The "time 
and place" connection which weighs 
heavily in the sexual assault jurispru- 
dence has not had the same force in 
judicial consideration of the theft/ 
fraud cases: the courts are not, in 
general, asking whether the embez- 
zling employee doctored the books 
at home or at work. 
Examples: vicarious liability 
imposed 
In each of the following cases, 
vicarious liability was imposed upon 
the employer, where the wrong was 
held to be a "mode" (although com- 
pletely unauthorized, and one the 
employer would not have author- 
ized, had the employer known) of 
doing the authorized function: 
An  employee of a fund manager 
breached his fiduciary duty by invest- 
ing in investments unauthorized by 
the client, and changing the nature of 
the account. The employer was liable 
(Ryder v. Osler, Wils, et al.). 





criminal act), there 




A solicitor's clerk engaged to draft 
documents and handle propertycon- 
veyances defrauded a firm client by 
having the client sign documents 
transferring the property to theclerk. 
The clerk was normally entrusted 
with the handling ofdeeds ofthe sort 
that he used in the fraud. The solici- 
tor was liable, as employer (Lloydv. 
Grace, Smith, and  Co.). O n  the other 
hand, where a clerk used the com- 
pany seal and other documents to 
fraudulently certify share certificates 
as genuine, liability was not imposed 
on the employer as the employee had 
no actual nor ostensible authority to 
warrant the authenticity ofshare cer- 
tificates (Ruben v. Great Fingall Con- 
solidated). More recently, where an 
employee fraudulently inveigled an- 
other party to enter into a three-year 
charter party where the employee 
did not have actual or apparent au- 
thority to enter into such a charter, 
the employerwas not liable (Armagas 
Ltd. v. Mundogas S.A.) . 
The employer was found vicari- 
ously liable for the actions of a cus- 
toms officer who was authorized to 
deal with dutiable mail, and who 
stole a parcel of diamonds entrusted 
to Canada Post. The Supreme Court 
of Canada held that the customs 
officer was doing fraudulently that 
which he was employed to do hon- 
estly (R. v. Levy Brothers Company 
Limitedand Western Assurance Com- 
pany). Traditional legal analysis re- 
gards this as essentially a case of 
- 
conversion. The employer had au- 
thorized the employee to take pos- 
session of the property, which the 
employee instead stole. Commenta- 
tors are unanimous in stating that 
- 
had the employee not been author- 
ized to take possession (i.e., if the 
employer had merely created an "op- 
portunity" to steal, such that the 
receptionist had intercepted and 
taken the parcel), there would have 
been no vicarious liability. 
Examples: no vicarious liability 
Historically, the courts have 
strained to make the distinction be- 
tween "mere opportunity," where 
no liability will be imposed, and 
"unauthorized modes," where liabil- 
ity is imposed. Doctrinally, it is very 
difficult to distinguish the cases dis- 
cussed below in which no liability 
was imposed, from the cases in the 
previous section, on anything other 
than a political or ideological dispo- 
sition of the courts. 
The caretaker of a building used a 
master key to enter an apartment, 
where he sexually assaulted a tenant. 
This conduct was held to be an inde- 
pendent act, not within the scope of 
employment, for which therewas no 
vicarious liability on the employer 
(although the building management 
company was held to be negligent 
for failing to take adequate care to 
control access to master keys): (Q. et 
al. v. Minto Management Ltd. et. al.). 
In the course of a union dispute, 
municipal firefighters adopted a "go 
slow" policy resulting in destruction 
of a property due to their delay in 
arriving ar [he fire scene. The  court 
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held that the delaying actions of the Speaking for the Court ofAppeal, judge, Justice Creaghan, applied the 
firefighters were in furtherance ofan 
industrial dispute, not in further- 
ance of the employer's business, and 
constituted "the very negation of 
carrying out some act authorized by 
the employer" (General Engineering 
Services Ltd. v. Kingston and St. 
Andrew Corporation). O n e  must 
question the extent to which the 
theftlfraud cases noted above could 
be construed as "in furtherance of 
the employer's business." This issue 
ofwhether the wrongful act is moti- 
vated by the individual employee's 
needs and desires, versus whether the 
act may be construed as in further- 
ance of the employer's enterprise, 
has also played a role in U.S. vicari- 
ous liability jurisprudence. 
Recent Canadian cases 
In a spate of recent cases, Cana- 
dian courts have revealed dissatisfac- 
tion with the Salmond test as it ap- 
plies to vicarious liability for sexual 
intentional torts. Thesupreme Court 
of Canada will shortly have the op- 
portunity to decide the jurispruden- 
tial model whichwill shapesexual as- 
sault litigation in the decades to come. 
The first Canadian appellate court 
decision, McDonald v. Mombour- 
quette, came from Nova Scotia, and 
involved the conduct of a Roman 
Catholic priest. Father Mombour- 
quette had plead guilty to charges 
under the Criminal Code, including 
a charge for indecent assault on F.M. 
E.M. had served as an altar server; 
Mombourquette was the ~ a r i s h  
priest. When F.M. was eleven years 
old, the priest invited him to join a 
"weight lifting" program; hewas told 
this would involve removing his 
clothes to be measured. O n  other 
occasions, Mombourquette took the 
boy to the glebe house and asked him 
for a back massage; he placed the 
boy's hand on his penis. The  trial 
judge had held that the Roman 
Catholic and Episcopal Corporation 
of Antigonish was vicariously liable 
for Mombourquette's actions. The 
Court of Appeal disagreed. 
. - 
Justice Jones stated: Salmond test and rejected vicarious 
liability stating: 
With respect the test is not sim- 
ply that an employee is placed in Jacob sexually assaulted the 
a position of trust and authority Plaintiff in circumstances that 
that provides the opportunity had nothing to do with his em- 
to do wrong. Applying that test ployment. 
employers would be liable for The  fact that he was afforded 
- .  
an opportunity or that he was a 
nurse on the unit where the 
The unique 





permits courts to 
examine the nature 
of the authority 
conferred on the 
employee. 
Plaintiffwas a patient does not 
in itself give rise to a claim of 
vicarious liability against the 
hospital.. . . (269) 
The New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal affirmed this decision noting 
that while the act was performed 
during work hours at the place of 
employment, the nurse was not as- 
signed to treat the patient. The "op- 
portunity" provided to the nurse was 
access to the room; he was not in a 
position of ultimate power, and his 
wrongful acts were not authorized 
by the employer. 
all wrongful acts of their em- 
ployees. It should be noted that 
- .  
the acts here were not negligent 
but criminal. (1 1 6 1  17) 
The court further held that there was 
no fiduciary duty owed by the Church 
directly to the plaintiff. Leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada was refused. 
A similar approach was taken in 
the New Brunswick case of].-P.B. v. 
Jacob. The male patient was admit- 
ted for an infected bronchial cyst and 
was on antibiotics and analgesics; his 
in-hospital care did not involve the 
touching of his genitals or genital 
area. One ofthe nurses on duty went 
into the patient's room, lowered his 
pyjamas, and touched the patient's 
penis with his hands or mouth. 
The employee had been a nurse 
for eight years. The trial judge found 
that prior to the assault the nurse had 
been a good employee, and the hos- 
pital had no reason to expect the 
sexual assault would occur. The trial 
British Columbia: a new approach 
O n  October 16, 1997, the Su- 
preme Court ofcanadagranted leave 
to appeal in two significant decisions 
of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal: B. (P.A.)v. Curry and T. (G) 
v.-Grf i ths .  These caseskill serve as 
the foundation for future Canadian 
jurisprudence on vicarious liability 
for sexual assaults by employees. 
In Curry, the trial judge had found 
the Children's Foundation liable for 
acts of sexual abuse committed be- 
tween 1968 and 1971 by one of its 
employees, Leslie Charles Curry, on 
a minor residing at one of the Foun- 
dation's residential group home fa- 
cilities. The Foundation provided 
residential care for children aged 6 
through 12; Mr. Curry was hired as 
a child care counsellor. His duties 
included: ensuring appropriate hy- 
giene; ensuring various house rules 
were obeyed; ensuring the children 
got to school on time; ensuring table 
manners were appropriate; ensuring 
the children went to bed on time; 
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ensuring the children bathed or 
showered themselves; ensuring the 
children's clothes were laid out 
properly; tucking the children in 
at night; providing an appropriate 
role model for the children; deal- 
ingin an age-appropriatewaywith 
the children's questions regarding 
sexuality; accompanying children 
on outings and physical activities; 
and providing a safe and secure 
environment for the children. Es- 
sentially, then, Mr. Curry was en- 
trustedwith the duties and obliga- 
tions of a parent in the lives of the 
children placed within his care. 
Mr. Curry remained with the 
Foundation until 1980; he was 
discharged after the Foundation 
received and investigated a com- 
plaint of sexual abuse against a 
resident child. In 1990, Mr. Curry 
was charged with 18 counts of 
gross indecency and two counts of 
buggery, some of which involved 
the plaintiff, and was convicted on 
all but one count. The acts which 
formed the basis for the civil suit 
occurred while Mr. Curry was on 
duty, both at the residential home 
and on  an outing, while the young 
boy was age 8 through 1 1. The abuse 
began with pats on the boy's but- 
tocks, both when he was clothed and 
when unclothed after a shower or 
bath. Later Mr. Curry entered the 
plaintiffs bedroom and fondled him 
under his pyjamas; the abuse esca- 
lated to include oral sex and buggery. 
In four separate judgments, the court 
held that the Children's Foundation 
was vicariously liable for the acts of 
its employee. 
Two strong women judges set out 
two new, and interesting, approaches 
to the issue of vicarious liability for 
sexual misconduct. Madam Justice 
Huddart rejected the Salmond test: 
. . . the Salmond test is of no use 
at all when the responsibility of 
an employer for the intentional 
tort of sexual assault by an em- 
ployee placed in a position of 
control over the victim comes 
to be considered. (83) 
Valerie Palmer, "Luna," oil on linen, 4 1.75" X 48.5': 1989. 
Courtesy of Nancy Poole's Studio, Toronto, Ontario. Photo: Tom Moore 
She continues: 
The Salmond test requires a 
conclusion that the sexual as- 
sault of a child is an unauthor- 
ized mode of parenting. The 
unique features of sexual assault 
cases require a contextual ap- 
proach that permits courts to 
examine the nature of the au- 
thority conferred on the em- 
ployee and the likelihood that 
the conferral of that authority 
will increase the probability ofa 
wrong occurring. (10 1) 
She held as follows: 
In my view, when the conferral 
of authority provides not mere 
opportunity, but the power over 
another that makes more prob- 
able a wrong, that employer 
should be vicariously liable for 
any suchwrong that results from 
an abuse of that power. (93) 
Although agreeing in the result, 
Madam Justice Newbury expressed 
concern that an emphasis on  the 
misuse of power or authority as a test 
for vicarious liability would "cast the 
net too widely" and that no vicarious 
liability should be found in the ab- 
sence of a "close connection" be- 
tween the employee's duties and his 
or her wrongful acts: 
These include what I would call 
functional connection-whe- 
ther the conduct in question 
was outwardly similar to au- 
thorized acts or duties; spatial 
connection-whether the con- 
duct occurred at the employer's 
premises; temporal connec- 
tion-whether it occurred dur- 
ing the employee's working 
hours; and (perhaps least use- 
ful) formal connection- 
whether the employer's "objec- 
tives" or "purposes" permitted 
or somehow encouraged the 
misconduct. (1 09) 
She notes that the conferral of 
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authority always makes the abuse of 
power more probable: 
I do not believe it is for us, in 
furtherance ofpolicy considera- 
tions, however valid, to make a 
radical change in the nature of 
vicarious liability such that it 
becomes asubstitute for the law 
of negligence but without the 
necessity of proof of the other 
elements thereof and without 
the protections given to defend- 
ants by that law. (109) 
In an attempt to achieve consen- 
sus, Justice Hollinrake also agrees 
that the "Salmond test" is inappro- 
priate for such sexual abuse cases, 
and that opportunity alone does not 
provide a basis for vicarious liability. 
He attempts to combine the tests set 
out by Madam Justices Newbury 
and Huddart as follows: 
In cases such as this (sexual as- 
sault) the general proposition 
for the imposition of vicarious 
liability is that there must be 
sufficient nexus between the du- 
ties of the employee as such and 
his misconduct. Whether or not 
there is that sufficient nexuswill 
depend on the nature of the 
power conferred on the em- 
ployee by his employment and 
the likelihood that conferral of 
power will make probable the 
very wrong that occurred. I em- 
phasize that this latter consid- 
eration does not, and as a matter 
of law, cannot include those 
cases where all that can be said 
in support of a finding ofvicari- 
ous liability is that the employ- 
ment and its corresponding 
duties provided the wrongdoer 
with the opportunity to com- 
mitthewrongfulact. (1 10-1 11) 
These factors-the type ofauthor- 
ity conferred, and the nexus between 
the authority and the abuse-were 
key to the subsequent decision in 
Grzfiths, considered by the same 
panel of the B.C. Court of Appeal. 
Griffithswas Program Director from 
1980 to 1992 for the Vernon Boys 
and Girls Club, a recreational club 
for children which offered a drop-in 
centre, conducted various outings, 
and had activities after school and on 
Sundays. There were two plaintiffs 
in the case. Mr. J. was assaulted by 
Griffiths in 1982, when the ten- 
year-old boy was invited to Griffiths' 
home (afterworkinghours). Ms. J.S. 
was subject to several incidents of 
sexual abuse, which commencedwith 
suggestive comments and touches. 
Shewas assaulted on one occasion on 
a bus where the two were sitting be- 
side each other on a sporting or field 
trip to Edmonton, and Mr. Griffiths 
forced her to put her hand on his pe- 
nis. When she was 14, Ms. J.S. and 
another friend visited Mr. Griffiths 
at his house, where he had inter- 
course with her. The trial judge found 
the Boys' and Girls' Club liable; this 
decision was overturned on appeal. 
Madam Justice Huddart, for the 
majority, held that the Boys' and 
Girls' Club was not vicariously li- 
able, as there was no abuse of job- 
created authority. She held that in 
his job Mr. Griffiths had no power or 
authority over children; the Boys' 
and Girl' Club did not stand in loco 
parentis; the boysandgirlswent home 
to their parents after every activity. 
Huddart states: 
These incidents do not provide 
evidence of the abuse ofjob-cre- 
ated authority. I can see nothing 
in the nature of the objectives of 
the Club or the group activities it 
organized for boys and girls or, 
most importantly, in the powers 
that the Club bestowed on Mr. 
Griffiths that increased the prob- 
ability of a wrong occurring be- 
yond the risk ordinarily occur- 
ring in our community when 
adults andchildren come together 
to participate in common activi- 
ties. (209-2 10) 
Madam Justice Newbury, dissent- 
ing in part, would have found vicari- 
ous liability, but only with respect to 
the abuse ofthe young girl on the bus 
trip. She concluded that with the 
exception of the assault on the bus, 
there was not a sufficiently close con- 
nection between Mr. Griffith's du- 
ties and the misconduct to warrant 
the imposition of vicarious liability. 
She held that "the fact that Mr. 
Griffiths 'cultivated his victims' in 
the performance of his duties is not 
by itself sufficient." 
From these cases, we can take it 
that: ( l )  some Canadian courts have 
determined that the Salmond test is 
insufficient for analyzing sexual abuse 
and employer liability, while others 
accept the test; (2) there is a strong 
predisposition in the courts to reject 
mere "opportunity" as sufficient to 
found strict liability; and (3) the 
nature of the powerlauthority con- 
ferred and the nature of the employ- 
ee's duties will form an essential com- 
ponent of any new test the Supreme 
Court of Canada may develop. 
Why vicarious liability? 
Courts are reluctant to impose vi- 
carious liability for intentional torts, 
and particularly sexual assault, in the 
absence of a clear connection to the 
employment context, and unless the 
abuse can be demonstrated to be 
clearly related to the actual or osten- 
sible authority conferred by the em- 
ployer. This stems from the fact that 
vicarious liability is imposed in the 
absence of any proof of fault. Re- 
gardless of the diligence of the em- 
ployer in seeking to guard against 
such abuse, and even where the em- 
ployee contravenes strict employer 
policies and practices, the vicariously 
liable employer will be liable for all 
the assessed damages. In the end, 
then, the decision as to whether or 
not liability should be imposed rests 
upon a clear policy decision: who 
should bear the cost of such wrong- 
doing? The innocent plaintiff? The 
corporation or institution which 
employed the wrongdoer, notwith- 
standing that they did everything 
they could to protect against that 
risk, and to that extent are innocent 
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as well? Doctrinally, in the absence 
of any proof of fault, knowledge, or 
negligence, this issue is a difficult 
one to decide. 
I have set out below both sides of 
the leading policy justifications of- 
fered: 
Prevention: One of the most com- 
pelling arguments is that vicarious 
liability enhances incentives for em- 
ployers to exercise utmost due dili- 
gence: itwill lead to the implementa- 
tion of all possible mechanisms to 
prevent the occurrence of sexual as- 
sault. Many other courts, however, 
argue that the goal of appropriate 
prevention (as opposed to "overcor- 
rection") is met by making an em- 
ployer liable for negligence, for fail- 
ing to do that which it should have 
done. 
There is also an argument that the 
imposition of vicarious liability will 
in fact lead to a decline in services 
offered due to an excess of caution by 
administrators. For example, the 
Supreme Court of California in John 
R. v. Oakland Unzjed School District 
was reluctant to place weight on the 
loss prevention argument, indicat- 
ing that "untoward consequences" 
could flow from the imposition of 
vicarious liability on school districts. 
The issue in this case was assault by 
a teacher on a student taking part in 
a home-study program, at the teach- 
er's home. The program of home- 
study was approved by the school 
board. The Court stated: 
. . . applying the doctrine of re- 
spondeat superior to impose, in 
effect, strict liability in this con- 
text would be far too likely to 
deter districts from encourag- 
ing, or even authorizing, extra- 
curricular andlor one-on-one 
contacts between teachers and 
students or to induce districts to 
impose such rigorous controls 
on activities of this nature that 
the educational process would 
be negatively affected. (438) 
CostInternalimtion/"&ternalities'I 
The "law and economics" argument 
is that sexual assault, like pollution, 
is an "externality," or a cost of the 
enterprise. In order to ensure eco- 
nomic efficiency (and appropriate 
pricing of services), the "sexual as- 
sault" cost of an enterprise should be 
visited upon the enterprise causing 
the problem. Certainly the employer 
and the enterprise benefit from the 
proper provision of services; 
shouldn't the enterprise also bear the 
cost of the improper provision of 
services? When dealing with certain 
social services (child care, policing, 
schooling), however, the answer is 
not to provide fewer services, or to 
increase the price of these services, 
which is how private enterprise deals 
with increased costs. As Madam Jus- 
tice Huddart states in B. (P.A.) v. 
Curly: 
[Tlhe enterprise of protecting 
children, like that of policing or 
teaching, cannot be expanded 
or contracted depending on the 
total cost ofproviding that serv- 
ice. A community's moral obli- 
gation to children cannot be 
ignored. However, the cost in- 
ternalization argument remains 
useful to the extent that it re- 
minds us that the increased costs 
arising from the conferral of 
authority must be borne by 
someone else. (89) 
It must be recognized that, par- 
ticularly in an era of fiscal restraint, 
there is clearly a risk that the services 
provided will be reduced (or new 
services will not be provided) due to 
the costs of increased litigation and 
damages awards. Scarce health-care 
dollars are redirected from patient 
care; the volunteer sports organiza- 
tion in the community will fold; 
rather than additional child-care 
workersor new programs for nursing 
mothers, the Children's Aid Society 
hires lawyers instead. 
AssuranceofCompensation: One of 
the primary reasons for seeking to 
affix liability to employers is to en- 
sure that the victim receives com- 
pensation. In many cases, the perpe- 
trator will not have the assets of the 
institutional employer. For exam- 
ple, in the Mombourquette case the 
priest entered no defence; equally, 
one can assume that he lacked the 
assets to pay any judgment. 
However, the law has always been 
reluctant to affix an innocent party 
(here, as no negligence or fault need 
be proven, there is no moral blame- 
worthiness attached to the em- 
ployer) with the unforeseeable costs 
of intentional criminal acts by em- 
ployees. 
There are significant costs associ- 
ated with the imposition of vicari- 
ous liability. There has been much 
debate in the American jurispru- 
dence with respect to insurance im- 
plications of vicarious liability. For 
example, Justice Baxter, states in 
Maly M. v. City of Los Angeles: 
Insum, the principles espoused 
by the majority have the po- 
tential to convert blameless 
public agencies into liability 
insurers for much, if not all, of 
the intentional misconduct 
committed by peace officers in 
their employ. Unlike commer- 
cial insurers, the innocent agen- 
cies can neither define the lim- 
its of their coverage nor collect 
premiums to finance it. (99) 
He also states: 
It is a truism to state that en- 
suringcompensationweighs in 
favour ofvicariousliability. The 
deeper the Defendant's pocket, 
the easier the Plaintiff is com- 
pensated. If ensuring compen- 
sation were the only goal, vi- 
carious liability should apply 
against all employers in all cases. 
However . . . the sympathetic 
. . 
desire to compensate the in- 
jured is not asufficient basis on 
which to impose vicarious li- 
ability. 
As stated by Chief Justice 
McEachern of British Columbia , 
in A. (C.) v. Critchley, "many de- 
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fendants sought to be made liable and oppression are central to the to ensure there are recreational clubs 
cannot insure themselves against this 
kind of a loss, and certainly cannot 
raise taxes in order to spread the loss" 
(506). 
Insurance is a real issue, particu- 
larly for small organizations, includ- 
ing sports teams, women's shelters, 
or volunteer boards. Many insur- 
ance policies exclude coverage for 
intentional criminal acts, or price 
prohibitively for sexual assault cov- 
erage. The American experience is 
instructive; as the number of sexual 
abuse claims has skyrocketed, the 
availability of coverage has declined 
while the price has dramatically in- 
creased. This increases the probabil- 
ity that desired services will not be 
provided if a strict liability regime is 
opposed. 
In the case of criminal acts includ- 
ing sexual assault, there is a statutory 
scheme applicable to victimswhereby 
they may receive very limited recom- 
pense for damages caused by crimi- 
nal acts. The problem with thisstatu- 
tory scheme is, of course, the very 
limited sums of money which do not 
approach the damage and costs sus- 
tained by those who are victims of 
breach oftrust or sexual assault. One 
of the answers, therefore, would be 
-to increase amounts paid to victims 
of sexual assault to ensure fair levels 
ofrecovery, whilespreading the costs. 
Feminist principles 
Do feminist principles demand 
that the morally blameworthy em- 
ployer, in all circumstances, should 
be liable for the sexual assault of its 
employees? Put aside institutions like 
Mount Cashel or Grandview. As- 
sume, instead, that we are looking at 
the National Association of Women 
and the Law (NAWL). NAWL is explic- 
itly founded on feminist and demo- 
cratic principles; there is regular re- 
view, discussion, and awareness 
amongst employees, the Board, and 
members of issues of power, author- 
iry, and abuse; the historical and 
cultural roles of women and chil- 
dren, patriarchy, difference theory, 
enterprise. When one of the employ- 
ees violates the trust of members, 
should NAWL automatically be held 
liable? And what if NAWL'S insurance 
doesn't cover intentional sexual acts? 
What if the judgment shuts down 
this organization? 
From a feminist perspective, we 
are not searching for a hard and fast 
test that will apply in all circum- 
stances: we should be analyzing every 
case contextually, and must be fully 
cognizant of all aspects of power 
relationships in institutions. T o  a 
certain extent, this calls for a more 
creative approach to the negligence 
aspects ofemployer liability for sexual 
assaults of employees. We should be 
more creative in the questions we 
ask: 
What is theinstitutional treatment 
ofwomen (children) really like? Are 
there any factors which indicate an 
unjustified difference which may 
have created the environment within 
which the assaults took place? 
What is the relationship at issue? 
Is it a fiduciary relationship, or one 
which otherwise carries with it an 
aura ofsafety or trust? The safety and 
trust with which women approach a 
therapist or spiritual counsellor is 
different than that with which they 
approach a bank. 
What are the actual power rela- 
tionships in the institution?Are there 
women in positions of authority? 
What is the actual practice of anti- 
sexism? Is this an institution where 
cultural infantalization and exploi- 
tation uis ri uis women and children 
are acceptable? Is this an institution 
which appears to put on numerous 
anti-harassment programs, but turns 
a blind eye to that which really goes 
on (the U.S. navy would be a good 
example). 
What are the real power dynamics 
at issue? Has the employer carefully 
analyzed and protected against the 
risks given the real (not superficial) 
power issues in play? 
We must remember that feminist 
principles must be based on whole 
women. We  are mothers who want 
and extra-curricular activities in our 
communities. We run caringorgani- 
zations, like sexual assault centres, 
community health centres, and 
homeless shelters, and we run our 
own private businesses. We sit on 
boards of organizations which are 
underfunded and lack insurance cov- 
erage. And we are also victims of 
sexual assault. From a principle of 
whole women, we must carefully look 
at all the implications. 
Given the concerns with the im- 
position of strict liability, regardless 
of context, perhaps we should be 
placing more weight on the difficult 
work of pushing the boundaries of 
negligence-so that contextual and 
subtle examinations of what institu- 
tions can and should be doing con- 
tinue. Extending the jurisprudence 
for breach of fiduciary duty and 
breach of trust, and a real examina- 
tion of power relationships is an- 
other route. We must make this form 
of inquiry acceptable and necessary 
in Canadian courtrooms. 
Where are we going? 
T h e  Canadian and American 
courts which have considered this 
issue have been careful in extending 
vicarious liability for sexual assault to 
require that the abuse relates directly 
to the nature of the job-created au- 
thority conferred on the abuser, and 
that it also has a clear connection 
with d~tiesofemployment. The B.C. 
Court of Appeal decisions indicate, 
however, how restrictive their pro- 
posed test is in its application. They 
found liability in the case of Curry, 
who stood i n  locoparentis in relation 
to the young children in his care and 
whose employment duties extended ? .  
to intimate care and hygiene. They 
were unwilling to impose vicarious 
liability, however, where the recrea- 
tional club program director was 
placed in a position where he had 
constant and daily contact with 
young boys and !girls. The distin- 
guishing feature, in the end, is likely 
the lack of work-related time and 
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place connection in the Grzfithscase, 
and the more limited authority con- 
ferred on the recreational program 
director. 
American cases have also been quite 
stringent with respect to the defini- 
tion of the kinds of employment in 
which liabilitywill be found; a major 
concern would be the failure to truly 
recognize the nature of the job-con- 
ferred authority in question, and a 
real insensitivity to power dynamics. 
In John R., for example, it was held 
that a school district could not be 
held vicariously liable for the actions 
of a teacher. In Maly M., however, 
the Court did hold liable the em- 
ployer of a police officer who raped a 
woman whom he had apprehended. 
The California court held that a po- 
lice officer, empowered by his badge 
to detain and apprehend, clearly had 
the kind of "authority" which the 
court held did not apply between a 
school teacher and his student. A 
recent California Supreme Court 
ruling in the case of Lisa M. v. Henry 
Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital 
further limits vicarious liability. In 
this case, an ultrasound technician 
assaulted a pregnant woman in the 
hospital by inserting the scanning 
wand in her vagina, and fondling the 
patient while telling her he "needed 
to excite her to get a good view of the 
baby." The Court rejected vicarious 
liability ofthe hospital, stating "If..  . 
the assault was not motivated or trig- 
- 
gered offby anything in the employ- 
ment activity, but was the result of 
only propinquity and lust, there 
should be no liability" (301). They 
indicated vicarious liability should 
only apply to injuries that are "as a 
practical matter sure to occur in the 
conduct of the employer's enter- 
prise," and inherent to or engen- 
dered by the working environment. 
To the extent that the nature of "job- 
conferred authority" becomes a key 
aspect ofthe test, lawyers will have to 
ensure they are building the appro- 
priate evidentiary record. We must 
locate experts to testify about theo- 
ries of control, compulsion, vulner- 
ability, trust, andauthority. We must 
be ever-vigilant with respect to de- 
veloping theories of negligence as 
well. 
A cursory review of the American 
jurisprudence reveals the broad range 
of cases in which vicarious liability is 
sought to be imposed. Many of the 
employers/institutions in these cases 
are composed of women who are 
deeply concerned with the welfare of 
their clients and patients, who strive 
hard to create a work environment 
which is safe for all employees and 
clients. They are shocked at the trans- 
gressions which may occur, particu- 
larly when they took all possible care 
to avoid such occurrences. Affixing 
liability in the absence of fault may 
drive the local women's shelter to 
close its doors, or may end the provi- 
sion of girl's soccer in your local 
community. Although I have not set 
out any answers, I hope I have painted 
a picture of the kinds of difficult 
questions which this issue raises. 
An earlier version of this paper was 
presented a t  the tweIfi-h biennal Na- 
tional Association of Women and the 
Law Confirence, 'IAccess to Justice for 
Women: The Changing Face of In- 
equality, '"held Octo ber30-Novem ber 
2, 1997, in Halifax, Nova Scotia. 
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